Why China Is Likely to Achieve Its Growth Objectives
In 2002, the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capita income by the year 2020. Starting at income levels of the year 2000, this would require a growth rate of 7.2 percent per annum in per capita income or close to 8.0 percent in GDP (M. Wang 2005) . Is China likely to meet that objective? That question has been a subject of debate in Asia, Europe, and America, with an array of both pessimistic and optimistic views.
In this paper I present some reasons for joining the optimists. Indeed, I will argue that China's GDP is likely to grow at rates of 8 percent per annum or more for a least a generationthat is, to 2030-and perhaps beyond that date. Before getting into substantive issues about the economic, structural, and political problems that will have to be overcome if the growth objectives are to be met, it is useful to look at some numbers in order to set the context for analysis.
Exceptionally rapid rates of growth have been achieved by several poor Asian countries for relatively long stretches of time since World War II. During the twenty years from 1950 to 1970, Japan grew at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent in per capita income, increasing its per capita income more than sixfold, an achievement that is 50 percent higher than the goal set by the Chinese leadership. Over the twenty years between 1960 and 1980, Singapore's growth in per capita income averaged 7.3 percent. The corresponding figure for South Korea between 1965 and 1985 was 7.6 percent, and Taiwan-China averaged 7.2 percent over the same period. Even China exceeded its new growth target over the 22-year period from 1980 to 2002, when the achieved growth rate averaged 8.2 percent per annum (Fogel 2004b) . So the target set by the leadership is well within the experience of the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia.
However, those who question whether the new goal is achievable do so not because they are unaware of the past experience of nations within the region, but because they doubt that China will be able to replicate the experience of past leaders between now and 2020. The doubts arise from beliefs that unresolved or emerging economic, political, and international problems are likely to reduce the recent growth rate substantially. One of the economic issues is the shaky state of the banking system, which is saddled with a high proportion of nonperforming loans.
The inefficiency and unprofitability of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also seen as a threat to future growth. Another problem is the growth in income disparities between the rapidly growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior provinces, between urban and rural labor, and between highly skilled and manual labor (cf. Heckman 2005) . There are also bottlenecks in infrastructure, including pressure on fuel supplies and electrical power, and the growth of environmental pollution. Although concern over the capacity of China to feed itself has diminished, concern over the adequacy of water supplies has risen. This is not an exhaustive list of the potential economic impediments to a continued high rate of economic growth, but it captures some of the main concerns.
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Although I recognize the importance of these issues, I shall not dwell on them at this point. I view them as issues that need to be addressed during the course of economic growth and, for reasons that I discuss in the second half of the paper, I believe that they will be addressed.
They are certainly on the "to do" lists of China's political leaders and their economic advisors, who stress the need for reducing social and economic imbalances. My initial focus is on more fundamental constraints to sustaining rapid economic growth for another generation, constraints that might undermine long-term growth prospects even if all the right things are done to resolve the current litany of problems.
To get at these potentially more binding constraints it is useful to disaggregate the sources of growth in per capita income between 1978 and 2002. The process is facilitated by equations (1) and (2) in Figure 1 . Equation (1) is merely an identity which states that the level of per capita income is equal to output per worker multiplied by the labor force participation rate. In equation (1) the output of the economy is divided into three sectors: agriculture, industry, and services. Labor productivity in each sector is weighted by that sector's share of the labor force.
Equation (2) is the rate of growth transformation of equation (1). It says that the rate of growth in per capita income is a weighted average of the sum of the rate of change in the labor share and of labor productivity of each sector plus the rate of change in the labor force participation rate. The sectoral weights are the mid-period shares of income originating in each sector. Table 1 shows that 69 percent of the growth in per capita income between 1978 and 2002 was due to increases in labor productivity within each of the three main sectors of the economy.
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The rise in labor productivity was most rapid in industry (6.2 percent per annum) despite the inefficient state-owned enterprises and the inefficiencies in the allocation of capital. As Lin and Tsai (2004, 355-356) have pointed out, the policy of gradually shifting from central control appears to have been more effective than the "big bang" approach. By sequencing reforms that successively enlarged the scope of the market sector, even the SOEs shifted most of their purchases and sales to market prices rather than plan prices.
Table 1 also shows that while changes in labor productivity were highest in the industrial sector, they were nearly as high in agriculture (5.7 percent in agriculture as compared to 6.2 percent in industry). Moreover, this high rate of growth in agricultural productivity has been sustained for more than two decades. Table 2 shows that although China's rate of growth in agricultural labor productivity over a two-decade period is not unprecedented, it is at the high end of experience in both Asia and Europe. Only Korea exceeded the Chinese growth in agricultural labor productivity between 1980 and 1997, but in contrast to China, most of the Korean agricultural labor force had already shifted into industry and services. In the Chinese case, half of the labor force is still in agriculture, so the interindustry effect might yet prove to be substantial. Indeed, it is likely to be somewhat larger in the next two decades than it was between 1980 and 2000.
Since about 30 percent of China's growth rate is likely to continue to come from interindustry shifts and modest increases in the labor force participation rate (cf. Johnson 2000) , growth rates of labor productivity within sectors need only average about 5 percent per year.
Several factors suggest that such growth rates are likely. Despite the remarkable advances of recent decades, the average technology is still well below best prevailing practice in each of the three sectors. Hence, growth in each sector will be stimulated by the diffusion of the best prevailing practice. Moreover, the frontier of technology is moving out rapidly, especially in the industrial and service sectors, but also in agriculture. Third, the investment in capital, especially human capital, is capable of rapid improvement in the next several decades. Finally, despite the preoccupation with possible overstatement of the Chinese growth rate due to inflated estimates of growth sent from localities, on balance it is likely that the true Chinese growth rate is understated, especially in the service sector, due to the failure adequately to account for improvements in the quality of output and the underreporting of small firms. I now want to elaborate briefly on these last two factors and assess their likely impact on growth rates over the next two or three decades. It is possible to quantify the impact of enhancing the quality of labor through education on the growth rate of per capita income by making use of the equations shown in Figure 2 . Equation (3) is a factor-augmenting production function in which L γ and K γ are indexes of labor and capital augmentation (in this discussion I will focus only on labor augmentation). Equation (4) merely rearranges equation (3) to put it in a more convenient form. The dependent variable is now labor productivity and the term in square brackets brings the augmentation indexes together with the index of total factor productivity. Equation (5) is the rate of growth transformation of equation (4). It indicates that when all other variables are held constant, labor productivity will grow at the rate of growth of labor augmentation multiplied by labor's share in income. Table 4 presents the information needed to implement equation ( It is estimated that in 2005-6 China will produce 3.3 million college graduates, India 3.1 million, and the United States 1.3 million (Colvin 2005) . However, in advancing the frontier of scientific training, the United States still has a considerable lead.
The Role of Factor Enhancement

Errors in the Measurement of Output
So far I have focused mainly on factor enhancement to support my contention that China is likely to achieve its growth targets. I want to turn now to the problems of measurement on the output side of equation (5). Errors in the measurement of national income from the output side have become increasingly severe. It is now clear that official estimates of GDP for the United
States badly underestimate U.S. economic growth because they do not take into account improvements in the quality of output, especially in such services as education and health care.
Children in secondary schools are taught more about science and technology today than postgraduate college students used to be taught a generation ago, let alone two generations ago.
Even more dramatic are the improvements in health care. A century and a half ago, people in their late thirties and early forties were more afflicted by chronic disabilities than people in their late sixties and early seventies are today. Not only has the average age at onset of disabilities been delayed by a decade or so, but once disabilities appear, there are now numerous effective interventions. Hernias, which used to be permanent and exceedingly painful conditions afflicting one out of every four males, can now be repaired by a surgical procedure that in the United States requires hospitalization for only 23 hours. Other areas where medical interventions have been highly effective include treatment of genito-urinary conditions, control of hypertension and reduction in the incidence of stroke, replacement of knee and hip joints, curing of cataracts, and chemotherapies that reduce the incidence of osteoporosis and heart disease (Fogel 2004a ).
Yet most of these great advances in health care and education are overlooked in the GDP accounts, because the values of these sectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor's time is considered no more effective today than an hour of a doctor's time was half a century ago, before the age of antibiotics and modern surgery. It has recently been estimated that the value of improvements in health care, if properly measured, are at least twice the cost of health care, but such calculations have not yet made their way into the GDP accounts (Cutler and McClellan 2001; Murphy and Topel 2003; Nordhaus 2003) . In the case of the United States, my own rough estimates indicate that allowing for such factors as the increase in leisure time, the improvement in the quality of health care, and the improvements in the quality of education would come close to doubling the U.S. annual growth rate of per capita income over the past century (from 2.0 to 3.6 percent per annum).
What is the implication of these statistics for understanding the change in standards of 
Will Political Instability Undermine Economic Growth?
So far I have focused purely on economic issues. Some analysts argue that political instability is a serious impediment to China's ability to maintain high rates of economic growth.
Several scenarios have been outlined in which political factors could thwart economic goals.
Some of these scenarios begin with an economic breakdown brought on by a sharp cyclical downturn that would raise unemployment and undermine a precarious social stability. Others warn that a growing social unrest has been brought on by the financial problems and inefficiencies of the state-owned enterprises. These problems have not only led to rising urban unemployment but have also resulted in the failure to pay promised wages, pensions, health-care allowances, and housing allowances (Bremmer 2005; Chaohua 2005 ). Still others warn of an impending breakdown in the banking system, which is beset by a huge burden of nonperforming loans, a breakdown that could undermine the microeconomic stability of the economy (Garnaut and Song 2004).
Other threats to stability that have been observed include: widespread corruption; internal power struggles; bubbles in real estate, international trade, and steel (among other products);
inequality between the urban and rural areas, between the coastal and interior provinces, between the highly educated elites and poorly educated masses, and between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities. One unique warning singles out the sharp rise in the sex ratio concentrated at ages 15-34, which, it is argued, will translate into high rates of crime and violence and may When speculating about the future, the range of possible scenarios is virtually unlimited.
The point at issue is not what might occur, but what is likely to occur. Moreover, many of the problems singled out are of long standing, such as the inefficiency of many state-owned enterprises. While these SOEs may be a drag on the economy, China has nevertheless been able to grow at over 8 percent per capita for a quarter of a century. The idea that these inefficient firms will suddenly go bankrupt is far-fetched. The policy of the State Council has been to gradually phase them out or to reorganize them on a profitable basis so as not to sharply increase unemployment. Not only does the government have the finances needed to continue subsidizing inefficient firms if it chooses to do so for economic or political reasons, but the burden of these subsidies will also gradually diminish, because the share of the industrial output supplied by these underperforming SOEs will gradually decline and the burden of a given level of subsidies will rapidly diminish with the economy growing so rapidly.
These points also apply to the problem of the state banks. Although the proportion of nonperforming loans may be about 35 percent, China is not in immediate danger of a collapse of its banking system. It is within the power of the government to remove this burden. The banks originally became saddled with the bad paper because the government obliged the banks to finance unprofitable SOEs. The inefficiencies and distortions in the economy produced by banking policies have been relieved by the large injection of foreign direct investment, encouraged by government policy, which has also facilitated the transfer of advanced technologies to China. With direct investment going largely into large-scale industry, the banks have been able to supply part of the capital needed by small-scale enterprises (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Fan 2005) . Movements in the direction of more effectively using the monetary system to manage business cycles, and contemplated reforms in capital markets, should also alleviate economic distortions. For example, the government recently restructured two of the four largest state-owned banks to bring their capital position up to international standards. Most important, perhaps, is the very low level of government indebtedness (less than a fifth of GDP), which gives the State Council leeway to pursue needed stabilization policies, including a rapid restructuring of the banking system, instead of the gradual policy of reform it is currently pursuing (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Fan 2005) .
Although there are disagreements about economic policy among the top leaders, the proposition that China should continue to transform itself into a market economy is not at issue.
Nor is there disagreement over the policy of promoting increasing autonomy in economic decisions as a lever of rapid economic growth. As many analysts have pointed out, the government is unified around a policy that has been called "market preserving federalism." This Chinese form of federalism limits the central government's control over economic decision making, promotes creative competition among local governments, constrains rent seeking, and provides an array of incentives to induce creative local enterprises. This type of federalism is also apparent in the design of the tax system, which has been called "fiscal federalism," and which is aimed at preventing taxation from stifling economic growth. In the tax reform of 1994, the central government limited its primary administration to VAT and taxes on centrally owned enterprises. It also set up local tax bureaus under the direction of local governments to supervise income taxes. While much remains to be done in the design of the fiscal system, especially with respect to narrowing regional inequalities, these issues are on the leadership's agenda of needed reforms. The central leadership is also aware of the danger that local autonomy may move in counterproductive ways that promote rent seeking, moral hazard, and other forms of corruption, and that it must monitor performance and penalize corruption where possible. The successful unfolding of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national and local goals, to discipline local authorities whose corrupt practices threaten the progress of reform, and to provide rewards to those who advance it (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003; Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1996; Krug, Zhu, and Hendrischke 2003) .
Some analysts argue that unless China permits competing political parties, powerful pressures will build up between the provinces and the center that will undermine political stability and thwart continued high rates of economic growth. Others argue that the unsolved inequalities have also built up pressures at the grass roots that threaten to become unmanageable (Goldstone 1995; Ohman 1995; Esarey 2002) . Other issues stressed by analysts include mounting environmental hazards, lagging development of public health programs, and endemic corruption (Shambaugh 2000; Chapman 2002 ).
The difficulty with these arguments is that they assume that the leaders of the CCP and Some analysts argue that leaders of the CCP and the State Council are out of touch with public opinion. However, the weight of evidence contradicts that view. Local and provincial governments have been using polling techniques to determine public opinion on an array of economic and social issues since the late 1980s. Academic critics of government policies abound and interactions between these critics and top government leaders are numerous. The range of problems raised by respondents to surveys mirrors the complaints of academic critics and foreign analysts, including widespread corruption, increasing inequality, persistent unemployment, burdensome taxes, and unpaid pensions. Nevertheless, the polls also reveal majority support for the central government and overwhelming belief that the courts, the press, and government institutions will be responsive to their grievances (Pei 2001; Lin et al. 2002; China Newsweek 2005) . complaints. It also reflects the rapid increases in income experienced by the great majority of households for more than a quarter of a century (Fewsmith 2003 , 2005a Prasad 2004. 2. The disaggregation shown in Table 1 is based on data from the China Statistical Yearbook 2003, pp. 26, 27, 313. In the absence of a GDP deflator, the retail fixed-base price index was used to obtain real GDP. Because the differential approximation shown in equation (1) does not quite add up to * Y , the sum of the terms on the right-hand side of the equation was used as the denominator when computing the contribution of changes in the LFPR, in inter-industry shifts in the labor force, and in within-sector productivity to the overall change in per capita income.
3. The relative index for other G-8 countries reporting data were somewhat different from those shown for the United States in Table 2 , but not materially so. Their use would not materially change the analysis. I prefer the U.S. figures as reported in Table 2 because it is likely that even they underestimate the impact of labor-augmentation on Chinese economic growth. The data reported by OECD for 6 of the G-8 countries for 1997, 1998, or 1999 Table 2 for several reasons. The values here are based on average income over both sexes rather than the median income for men only. The age range here excludes persons aged 65 and over. The years used here are 1997, 1998, or 1999 rather than 2000. But the most important factor is that the base here is less than twelfth grade rather than less than ninth grade. It should be noted that in Table 2 , the ratio of the income of persons with college degrees to those with high school degrees is 173. In this note it is 181. 1980 1990 1997 2000 1980 1990 1997 2000 1980 1990 1997 Table 394 . http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/xls/tabn394.xls Note: Gross enrollment ratios are equal to the total enrollment of all ages in the school level divided by the population of the specific ages that correspond to the specific age groups that correspond to the school level. Ratios may exceed 100 because of the students outside the relevant age range. Table 383 . http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ d01/ dt383.asp).
